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REGULATORY COMPETITION IN FOCUS
Daniel C. Esty*
One of the central issues in recent regulatory reform debates has been the
question of whether government regulation should be undertaken at central-
ized or more decentralized levels. In the United States, 'new federalists' argue
for a broad return of regulatory authority to the states and even to the local
governments. Newt Gingrich argues: 'We must replace our centralized, micro-
managed, Washington-based bureaucracy with a dramatically decentralized
system more appropriate to a continent-wide country ... closer is better
should be the rule of thumb." A number of academics have joined this debate
with scholarly arguments to support the call for decentralized governance
processes. Ricky Revesz, for example, suggests that not only does geographic
diversity argue for decentralized regulatory approaches, but that a set of hori-
zontally arrayed jurisdictions competing in the regulatory realm - creating, in
effect, a market in 'locational rights' - will produce enhanced social welfare.2
But while a whole field of academic literature has emerged from Charles
Tiebout's seminal 1956 article positing the benefits of regulatory competi-
tion,3 others have worried that inter-jurisdictional competition could trigger
a welfare-reducing 'race toward the bottom' in standard setting.4 Still others
have concluded that the results of regulatory competition are likely to be
highly sensitive to context and that the conditions under which regulatory
competition will generate welfare gains might be quite limited.5
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How widespread are the gains from regulatory competition likely to be?
When will harmonization of standards produce better results? These issues
have generated a raging debate in US academic circles. While Revesz places
his argument in the environmental context, other scholars suggest that regu-
latory competition might improve social welfare in a range of regulatory
domains. Notably, Ralph Winter and Roberta Romano argue in favor of inter-
state competition in the corporate law domain.6 Henry Butler and Jon Macey
observe that such gains might be obtained in the banking field but only if
federal deposit insurance does not create an economic externality by creating
an incentive for higher risk tolerance among state regulators who know that
any bank that fails will be bailed out by the national FDIC guarantees.7
Similar debates are going full-bore within the European Union around the
concept of 'subsidiarity'. After several decades of growing centralization of
regulatory authority in Brussels and the issuance of hundreds of EU-wide
'directives' that seek to harmonize standards across the European Union,
critics are casting doubt on the benefits of this movement toward uniformity.'
Indeed, the EU's response to divergent regulatory standards clearly draws on
the logic of the trade realm where such differences are perceived as a potential
basis for unfair competitive advantage and perhaps even decried as 'beggar
thy neighbor' policies.
The debate over whether some form of harmonization or convergence of
standards produces superior results by mitigating the risk of a race toward
the bottom in regulatory standard setting or whether regulatory competition
will generate pressures that will be welfare-enhancing has now spilled over
into the global realm as the World Trade Organization (WTO) attempts to
sort out the rules of behavior for international commerce. Calls for common
labor, environment, tax, and antitrust (competition) standards are growing.
Where inter-jurisdictional externalities exist (e.g. transboundary pollution
spillovers), a strong consensus backs the need for overarching common rules.
But where no such spillovers are present, the argument for regulatory diversity
seems much stronger. Nevertheless, there remains a high degree of confusion
and disagreement as to these points.
Believing that the 'regulatory competition versus harmonization of stand-
ards' debate would benefit from more solid analytic underpinnings, the Yale
Law School and University of Liege Center for European Legal Studies
organized a workshop in New Haven, Connecticut, in October 1999.
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Drawing scholars from both sides of the Atlantic, the workshop examined the
social welfare implications of regulatory competition comparatively across:
(1) regulatory areas (environment, banking, corporate law, labor, tax,
antitrust); (2) models of economic integration (from highly integrated sys-
tems, such as the United States to somewhat less integrated systems such as
the European Union, to loosely integrated regimes such as the WTO); and
(3) disciplinary perspectives (law, economics, business, and political science).
The workshop sought to sharpen thinking about the circumstances that would
likely yield gains from regulatory competition and to contrast these cases with
others where heightened cooperation in standard setting or broader regulatory
harmonization might increase social welfare.
A consensus seems to have emerged in support of the hypothesis that bene-
fits from regulatory competition are highly context specific - making the com-
parative analysis especially illuminating. The full range of papers spelling out
when and where these benefits are likely to be found will be published late in
the year 2000 in an Oxford University Press volume tentatively titled Regu-
latory Competition and Economic Integration (Daniel C. Esty and Damien Gera-
din, eds). We have selected, however, a few of the key papers that highlight
the critical issues to publish in advance in this issue of the Journal of Interna-
tional Economic Law.
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